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UNCHECKED POWERS: THE SUPREME
COURT AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
E. P. KRAUSS*
INTRODUCTION

Four Republican Presidents, all of whom promised in varying degrees to
use their power to lessen the burden of government on the American people, appointed all but one of the sitting Justices of the Supreme Court.'
These Justices have often endorsed a philosophy of judicial restraint. Ironically, this judicial philosophy has caused a substantial weakening of the
system of "checks and balances." Beginning in the 1970s, the Supreme
Court embarked upon a course of decisions which have left the power of
government bureaucracies, in large measure, unchecked.
This Essay contains an examination of the Supreme Court's role in articulating principles of contemporary administrative law. The exercise of
governmental power by administrative agencies is held in check by four

principal mechanisms: (1) structural constraints imposed under the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers; (2) statutory constraints set forth
generally in the Administrative Procedure Act and specifically in each
agency's organic legislation; (3) the requirement that individuals be treated
fairly in conformity with the standards of procedural due process; and (4)
the institutional role of judicial review to assure agency adherence to applicable legal standards. The Court's recent decisions in each of these areas is
* Professor of Law, Salmon P. Chase College of Law, Northern Kentucky University. I wish
to thank my students Jeffrey Schaefer and Sharon Klosterman, whose infectious enthusiasm and
dedication during the National Administrative Law Moot Court Competition at the University of
Dayton provided me with inspiration at a crucial time in the drafting of this article.
1. When Richard Nixon took office in 1969, the Supreme Court of the United States consisted
of Hugo Black, William 0. Douglas, John M. Harlan, William Brennan, Potter Stewart, Byron
White, and Thurgood Marshall. The seats of Chief Justice and one Associate Justice were vacant.
Of the seven Justices on the Court in 1969, only Justice White remains. Democratic presidents
appointed four: Lyndon B. Johnson appointed Justice Marshall, John F. Kennedy appointed Justice White, and Franklin D. Roosevelt appointed Justices Douglas and Black. The other three,
Justices Stewart, Harlan, and Brennan were appointed by Republican President Dwight D. Eisenhower. Since 1969 Republican Presidents Nixon, Ford, Reagan, and Bush have filled all nine of
the Associate Justice vacancies and the two vacancies for Chief Justice that have occurred. The
Court at this time consists of: Chief Justice Rehnquist, appointed by President Nixon and later
elevated to Chief Justice by President Reagan; Justice White, appointed by President Kennedy;
Justice Stevens, appointed by President Ford, Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Scalia, appointed
by President Reagan; and Justices Souter and Thomas, appointed by President Bush.
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surveyed in sections I through IV. A brief conclusion considers some practical implications of the Court's administrative law decisions.
I.

STRUCTURAL CONSTRAINTS:

SEPARATION OF POWERS

Implicit in the United States Constitution is the notion of limited government. The foremost mechanism for limiting the expansion of governmental power is the system of internal checks and balances incorporated
into the text of the main body of the Constitution. The document that
emerged from the Constitutional Convention in 1787 contains little in the
way of an explicit recognition of individual rights. Rather, the Constitution
focuses on the structure and distribution of responsibility among governmental institutions. In particular, the first three articles of the Constitution
establish coordinate branches of the central government invested with legislative, executive, and judicial power. The document gives no clue as to the
essential nature of these powers. It merely prescribes the method of operation for each branch. Thus, the Congress acts under the principle of majoritarianism within a bicameral structure. The President commands the
military and supervises executive departments. The courts decide cases.
The separation of powers doctrine preserves this structure by calling into
question the usurpation or subversion of the constitutional role of one
branch brought about by the actions of another.
The governmental power wielded by administrative agencies has frequently been subjected to judicial scrutiny under the separation of powers
doctrine. The governing principles laid down by the Supreme Court in recent cases have been very accommodating to administrative agencies, upholding their powers in the face of constitutional challenge, and restricting
legislative and even executive checks on the exercise of such power. The
Supreme Court's deference to agency power is reflected in decisions challenging the transfer of legislative and judicial power to administrative agencies. The Court's general hostility to checks on the exercise of power by
administrative agencies is exemplified by decisions reviewing legislative efforts to control agencies and to free them from executive control.
A.

Transfers of Legislative Power to Administrative Agencies: The NonDelegation Doctrine

The non-delegation doctrine requires that legislative authorization of
agency action be accompanied by an "intelligible principle" 2 and legislative

2. J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
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"standards" 3 adequate to convey to the agency its lawful role and to appropriately confine the agency's discretion "within banks that keep it from
overflowing." 4 This rule provides a dual measure of governmental accountability. In the absence of adequate legislative standards, it is impossible to
judge whether an agency is acting in accordance with its authorization. Review of agency action would become a matter of judicial guesswork at best.
In addition to providing a measure of agency accountability, the requirement that there be adequate legislative standards means that Congress can
be called upon to account for its action as well, both in the face of constitutional scrutiny and in the public mind. Vague or excessively broad grants
of power to administrative agencies would surrender Congress' constitutional role in propounding national policy.
Despite its laudable theory, the non-delegation doctrine has not been an
effective or practical tool. Only twice has the Supreme Court invalidated
legislation on non-delegation grounds, both instances occurring in 1935.5
In the ensuing decade, broad delegations of power were upheld in an unbroken line of decisions.'
The Supreme Court has never expressly disavowed the non-delegation
doctrine, but by 1980 it had long been moribund.7 In that year, Justice
Rehnquist added a separate concurring opinion in IndustrialUnion Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute' which argued that the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 contained an unconstitutional,
standardless delegation of authority for the Secretary of Labor to regulate
toxic materials in the workplace "to the extent feasible." 9 In Justice Rehnquist's view, the phrase "to the extent feasible" rendered the delegation so
uncertain as to leave to the Secretary the fundamental policy choices involved in balancing interests in economics and worker health. Such choices
are the constitutional responsibility of the Congress. Justice Rehnquist concluded that: "[lit is the hard choices, and not the filling in of the blanks,
3. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 434 (1935) (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
4. Id at 440 (citations omitted).
5. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Refining,
293 U.S. 388.
6. Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948); American Power & Light Co. v. Securities &
Exch. Comm'n, 329 U.S. 90 (1946); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944); Federal Power
Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944); National Broadcasting Co. v. United
States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
7. National Cable Television Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 353 (1974) (Marshall,
J., concurring and dissenting).
8. 448 U.S. 607 (1980). A sharply divided Court invalidated the OSHA standard for workplace exposure to benzene.
9. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1988).
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which must be made by the elected representatives of the people. Where
fundamental policy decisions underlying important legislation about to be
enacted are to be made, the buck stops with Congress and the President."'
Justice Rehnquist's resuscitation of the non-delegation doctrine was followed by an attempt in Bowsher v. Synarl to restore the doctrine to health.
The plaintiffs in that case argued to a special three-judge district court, presided over by then Circuit Judge Antonin Scalia, 2 that the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985
contained an unconstitutionally excessive delegation of budget-cutting
power to the Comptroller General of the United States. In a per curiam
opinion, the district court acknowledged the continued vitality of the nondelegation doctrine, but conceded that its application required considerable
deference to the will of Congress in accordance with the post-1935 decisions
of the Supreme Court. 13 Applying that standard, the court concluded that
the delegation of authority to the Comptroller General did not violate the
non-delegation doctrine, but that it unconstitutionally conferred executive
power on an official controlled by Congress. 4 Counsel for the National
Treasury Employees again raised the non-delegation argument to the
Supreme Court. Although the Court's opinion did not reach the issue, Justice Blackmun's dissent agreed with the district court.' 5
The Supreme Court eventually confronted the revived non-delegation
doctrine head-on in Mistretta v. United States.16 In 1988, John Mistretta
was convicted of a federal drug offense and, in accordance with Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, was sentenced to pay a fine and serve a term of incarceration to be followed by a period of supervised release.' 7 Mistretta
appealed the sentence, arguing that the Sentencing Reform Act of 198418
unconstitutionally authorized the United States Sentencing Commission to
promulgate sentencing guidelines. The Act incorporated into the federal
criminal justice system two fundamental shifts in penal philosophy. First, it
10. Industrial Union, 448 U.S. at 687 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
11. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
12. The district court decided Synar on February 7, 1986. Synar v. United States, 626 F.

Supp. 1374 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Only four months later, Chief Justice Burger announced his retirement effective at the end of the term. Justice Rehnquist was elevated to Chief Justice and President Reagan appointed Judge Scalia to fill the resulting opening on the Court.

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id. at 1384-85.
See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 719-21.
Id. at 778 n.1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
488 U.S. 361 (1989).
Id. at 370-71.

18. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3586 (1988), 18 U.S.C.S. app. (Federal Sentencing Guidelines) (1990),
28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988).
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sought to redress a perceived intractable problem of disparate sentences
meted out to apparently similarly situated defendants under the existing
system of indeterminate sentencing. The Reform Act promotes greater uniformity by substantially curtailing the sentencing judge's discretion. The
second philosophical shift is embodied in the Act's explicit rejection of rehabilitation models of corrections 19 and the endorsement of "retributive,
educational, deterrent, and incapacitative goals" 20 instead. Thus, it is clear
that in the Sentencing Reform Act, Congress took a very definite stance on
major policy issues. The question raised by the appeal of Mistretta's sentence was whether the Constitution requires Congress to take a stand on the
precise punishment to fit each particular federal crime, or, in the alternative, leaves the entire matter to the discretion of the sentencing judge. The
Supreme Court determined that there is no such constitutional requirement.
Justice Blackmun's opinion for an eight-justice majority provided a
comprehensive review of the non-delegation doctrine.2 1 The evident import
of this extensive treatment is that the doctrine should be taken seriously as a
potential source of constraint on the power of administrative agencies.
Nevertheless, the Court found that the legislative specification of purposes
of punishment, means used, and factors to be taken into account, more than
adequately confined the discretion of the Sentencing Commission. Having
identified sufficient statutory standards, Justice Blackmun concluded: "Developing proportionate penalties for hundreds of different crimes by a virtually limitless array of offenders is precisely the sort of intricate, laborintensive task for which delegation to an expert body is especially
appropriate."2 2
In light of the Court's deft analysis of the Sentencing Reform Act, one
must wonder whether any act of legislation might not be sustained by an
overly-facile conclusion that it contains adequate standards. A likely example is the unanimous decision in Touby v. United States.2 3 The Court upheld the authority of the Attorney General under the Controlled Substances
Act to temporarily schedule so-called "designer drugs," subjecting individuals who possess or distribute such substances to the threat of criminal
prosecution. Under the Act, the Attorney General must find that temporary scheduling is "necessary to avoid an imminent hazard to the public
safety."'24 In making this determination, the Attorney General is required

19. 28 U.S.C. § 994(k) (1988).
20. Mistrelta, 488 U.S. at 367 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (1988)).

21. Id. at 371-79.
22. Id. at 379.

23. 111 S.Ct. 1752 (1991).
24. 21 U.S.C. § 811(h)(1) (1988).
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to consider various factors relative to the substance's use and abuse. The
Court held that these standards adequately constrain the Attorney General's discretion to define criminal conduct. 25 An order to temporarily
schedule a substance becomes effective thirty days after publication in the
Federal Register and is not subject to judicial review 26 unless after a year it
is permanently listed. Moreover, the Attorney General has the power to
sub-delegate his authority, which he did in this instance by authorizing the
Drug Enforcement Administration to exercise the power to temporarily
schedule drugs. The net effect of this arrangement is that the public prosecutor is authorized to empower the police to make laws that together they
will enforce. It is tempting to conclude that the real standard being applied
is a "scourge of drugs" standard rather than any meaningful provision for
agency accountability.
Justice Scalia offered an alternative approach to the problem of excessive delegation in his dissenting opinion in Mistretta.27 A sense of frustration may be reflected in his statement that "while the doctrine of
unconstitutional delegation is unquestionably a fundamental element of our
constitutional system, it is not an element readily enforceable by the
courts."'2 The theory Justice Scalia advanced relies on "the Constitution's
structural restrictions that deter excessive delegation." 2 9 According to Justice Scalia, legislative delegations of power are constitutional only if the
lawmaking authority conferred on the recipient agency is ancillary to an
otherwise constitutional exercise of executive or judicial power.3 0 The fallacy of this approach is that the very same power to which Justice Scalia
objects, when placed in the bailiwick of the Sentencing Commission, may be
constitutionally exercised by a federal parole board because it is ancillary to
that body's executive authority to carry out sentences. The deceptive symmetry of Justice Scalia's tidy constitutional architecture fails to provide a
meaningful check on administrative power.
25.

Touby, 111 S. Ct. at 1757.

26. In a separate concurrence, Justice Marshall opined that review of an order to temporarily
schedule a controlled substance in the context of a criminal enforcement proceeding would not be
precluded. Id. at 1758 (Marshall, J., concurring). For a discussion of statutes precluding judicial
review of administrative action, see infra notes 158-74 and accompanying text.
27. 488 U.S. 361, 413 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 415.

29. Id. at 417.
30. Id. at 417-18.
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Transfers of Adjudicatory Responsibilitiesto Administrative Agencies:
The Role of Article III

The Constitution provides a framework for the establishment of the federal judiciary in Article III. Nevertheless, the other branches play essential
roles in the appointment of judges and the creation of federal courts. The
salient characteristics of all federal courts ordained in conformity with the
provisions of Article III are that their judges enjoy life tenure and salary
protection,3 1 and their jurisdiction extends only to the decision of cases or
controversies. 32 However, it has long been recognized that the adjudication
of certain cases may be assigned to tribunals which do not come within the
limitations of Article III.33 The expansion of agency adjudicatory authority
has accompanied the rise of the regulatory welfare state since the late nineteenth century. Article III's framework for the judicial power of the United
States constitutes a potential check on this expansion, and the Court in recent years has considered this possibility several times.
A leading decision in this area resulted from a challenge to the constitutionality of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.34 The Act conferred jurisdiction on
bankruptcy courts, whose judges do not enjoy Article III protections, to
decide all civil actions related to a bankruptcy petition. 35 Writing for a
plurality, Justice Brennan concluded that the Act's broad grant of jurisdiction violated Article 111.36 According to the plurality, the federal government's power to decide cases is the exclusive province of the judiciary
unless the matter falls within one of three narrow exceptions: territorial
courts, court-martial, and the adjudication of cases involving "public
rights.",37 The plurality concluded that none of these exceptions applied to
the underlying claims which were based on contract and warranty.
The case obviously was unrelated to congressional power to provide for
governance of the territories of the United States or of the armed forces.
With respect to the "public rights" exception, the plurality was somewhat
vague, but confidently stated: "The doctrine extends only to matters arising
31. U.S. CoNsT. art. 4116 146.2 Tm 0 wcirtextends
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'between the Government and persons subject to its authority in connection
with the performance of the constitutional functions of the executive or legislative departments,' and only to matters that historically could have been
determined exclusively by those departments." 3 8 Although the right to a
discharge in bankruptcy may arguably come within this conception of
"public rights," the dispute between the Northern and Marathon companies clearly did not.
The Northern Pipeline plurality ascribed a central role to Article III in
defining the limits of congressional power to transfer adjudicatory authority
to administrative agencies. Unfortunately, the rigid formalism of Justice
Brennan's approach produced a practical catastrophe that is difficult to explain rationally. The direct impact of the decision in Northern Pipeline was
to broadly invalidate crucial provisions of the Bankruptcy Act, requiring
Congress to act quickly to replace it with a constitutional law. It is no
mean feat for the legislature to discern a clear constitutional standard in the
seriatim opinions of four justices.3 9 Moreover, this occurred at the precise
moment when the United States economy was experiencing a severe recession which produced a large volume of bankruptcy filings. The plurality
did not consider the potential for a miscarriage of justice resulting from the
exercise of adjudicatory authority by federal bankruptcy judges who do not
enjoy life tenure. For example, the meritocratic process for selection of
bankruptcy judges goes far to assure litigants that their claims will be fairly
and competently adjudicated, but this did not figure in the analysis. The
plurality's formalism is as troubling with respect to the transfers of adjudicatory power that it permits as it is regarding the transfers it proscribes. If
an agency's adjudicatory power can be placed in one of Northern Pipeline's
three pigeon-holes, it is left unchecked by the separation of powers principle
and the terms of Article III.
In subsequent cases, the Court has embraced a more flexible approach
to Article III scrutiny of transfers of judicial power to administrative agencies. In Thomas v. Union Carbide AgriculturalProducts Co.' ° and Com-

38. Id. at 67-68 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932) (citing Ex Parte Bakelite
Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 458 (1929)).
39. Justices Blackmun and Stevens joined with Justice Brennan; Justice Rehnquist wrote a

concurring opinion in which Justice O'Connor joined; Chief Justice Burger dissented; and Justice
White authored a dissenting opinion to which Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell added their
concurrence.

40. 473 U.S. 568 (1985). The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act requires
competitors to share certain research test results and to submit disputes over compensation for use
of such data to binding arbitration. Id. at 571-73. In an opinion by Justice O'Connor, the Court
held that the binding arbitration provision does not violate Article III. Id. at 589.
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modity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor,4 ' the Court upheld transfers
of judicial power to administrative agencies where the enlargement of
agency power was not great and it was deemed necessary to protect the
overall administrative scheme. These decisions represent a more pragmatic
approach to the problem than that of the plurality in Northern Pipeline,but
they appear to have expanded the "public rights" doctrine to cases in which
the government is not a party.4 2 This is not an inherently indefensible development. It is consistent with a long tradition in American administrative law of antipathy to legalistic manipulations that evade or undermine
legitimate agency authority. 3 It may be, however, indicative of a trend
toward greater permissiveness and accommodation of expansions of agency
adjudicatory authority. Two decisions handed down last term tend to confirm the existence of such a trend. In Peretz v. United States,' the Court
held that Article III does not bar the use of federal magistrate judges (who
are administrative officers of the court and do not enjoy Article III protections) to conduct voir dire in a criminal trial. That same day, in Freytagv.
Commissioner,a" the Court held that the United States Tax Court is a
"court of law""4 even though it was not established pursuant to Article
III.' The Court concluded that the Tax Court is a court of law because it
exercises judicial power and functions exclusively as a court.4 s In other
words, it is constituted in conformity with the "case or controversy" limitation of Article III, but not with the tenure and salary protections. It appears that the Court is willing to let Congress have it both ways: It may
choose to establish a so-called "Article I tribunal" free of some of the Article III limitations but, if it invests this tribunal exclusively with "judicial"
power and function, then it will be treated as a court of law for Appointments Clause purposes. Again this is not a patently intolerable result. The
41. 478 U.S. 833 (1986). In another opinion by Justice O'Connor, the Court held that the
CFTC's jurisdiction to decide state law counterclaims in an action properly brought before the
agency is not barred by Article III. Id. at 857.
42. See Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 54 (1989); see also iL at 65-70 (Scalia,
J., concurring) (criticizing the expansion of the "public rights" doctrine).
43. See, e.g., Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501 (1943) (target of an investigation is not permitted to challenge the agency's jurisdiction in the context of a subpoena enforcement proceeding); Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938) (litigants must
exhaust administrative remedies prior to seeking judicial relief).
44. 111 S. Ct. 2661 (1991).
45. 111 S. Ct. 2631 (1991).
46. Id. at 2645.
47. The Appointments Clause provides: "Congress may by law vest the appointment of...
inferior officers... in the Courts of law, or in the Heads of Departments." U.S. CONsT. art. Il,

§ 2.
48. Freytag, 111 S. Ct. at 2645-46.
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power of the Chief Judge of the Tax Court to appoint minor officials is
hardly a significant threat to the constitutional balance. A probing analysis
of the functions and methods of the Tax Court seems appropriate in evaluating that institution's status vis-A-vis the Appointments Clause. After all,
the Constitution is more than an organizational charter; it articulates fundamental law. Analysis of governmental function is relevant to the determination of whether the values enshrined in fundamental law have been
advanced or offended.
Perhaps Justice Scalia expressed a preferable view when he concluded
that the Tax Court is an "executive department" rather than a "court of
law."4 9 Though there may be appropriate checks on the power of the Tax
Court contained in the statutory provisions that define its function, it is a
questionable practice to conclude that these limitations transform administrative power into judicial power, and administrative agencies into courts of
law. Notwithstanding the ability of courts to analyze agency functions, all
things considered, that analysis is likely to be more useful in an environment in which the words of the Constitution have reliable meaning.
Freytag starts down the path toward inconsistent and unpredictable interpretations of the constitution's text.
C. Legislative Control of Administrative Agencies
An act of legislation is required to create an administrative agency. As
guardian of this seminal power, Congress fixes the jurisdiction, function,
powers, and resources available to administrative agencies. The power to
reorganize an agency, modify its mission, or even abolish it through new
legislative enactments is non-controversial. From time to time, however,
Congress has attempted to retain for itself additional checks on administrative agencies. The Court has taken a dim view of such innovations and has
emphasized specific structural constraints in the Constitution and the doctrine of separation of powers in striking them down.
In Buckley v. Valeo,5 ° the Supreme Court struck down provisions of the
1974 amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act which it found
violated the Appointments Clause. The Act was a legislative response to
abusive practices in the 1972 presidential election revealed during the investigation of the Watergate scandal. In enacting federal election law reform
that would have a direct impact on every representative seeking re-election,
Congress understandably sought to assure itself that the Act would be enforced in accordance with its wishes. It attempted to do so by authorizing
49. Id. at 2650-60 (Scalia, J., concurring).
50. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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the creation of an administrative agency, the Federal Elections Commission, whose membership would include, among others, individuals appointed by the political leadership of each of the two major parties in both
Houses. The Commission's duties were to include investigation and prosecution of alleged violations of the Act. The Court held that these were
essentially "executive functions" that could constitutionally be performed
only by officers of the United States appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Appointments Clause. Congress' attempt to place a bi-partisan
check on the agency's enforcement power was fatally defective because the
Constitution withholds from Congress the power to fill the executive offices
it creates. 51
A more commonly employed legislative check on agency power, the legislative veto, was invalidated in INS v. Chadha.5 2 A retained legislative
veto power is a direct, expeditious check on administrative infidelity or
agency misapprehension of congressional intent. Its effectiveness was so
satisfactory that Congress incorporated the device into nearly 200 federal
statutes prior to the decision in Chadha.53 Presumably, Congress was willing to delegate more expansive powers and greater flexibility to agencies,
knowing that it could maintain continuing oversight.54 The particular procedure struck down in Chadha was a one-House legislative veto power over
administrative waiver of deportation authorized by the Immigration and
Nationality Act. This procedure allowed a majority vote in either House to
veto a decision of the Attorney General to waive deportation. The Supreme
Court held that this violated the presentment and bicameralism requirements of Article I. The Court construed the one-House veto as a legislative
act. As such, the Constitution requires that it be passed by a majority in
both Houses, and be presented to the President to be signed into law before
it can take effect. The import of Chadhais that these requirements may not
be circumvented, regardless of whether the innovation has the effect of aggrandizing the power of Congress, or instead checks and balances newly
created administrative powers. Arguably, this was the case under the Immigration and Nationality Act.
The Court's refusal to base decisions on the practical impact of innovative arrangements with respect to the balance of power in the federal government was carried to new extremes in Bowsher v. Synar.5 5 As in Buckley,
Congress experimented in an effort to achieve bipartisan cooperation-this
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

See generally Freytag, 111 S. Ct. at 2652-53 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
462 U.S. 919 (1983).
See id. at 1003 (White, J., dissenting) (appendix to Justice White's opinion).
Id at 1014 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
478 U.S. 714 (1986).
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time on fiscal policy. The "automatic" budget-cutting mechanisms in the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings law required an official to formulate a compromise between two economic forecasts: one prepared by the Congressional
Budget Office reflecting the views of the Democratically controlled Congress; and the other prepared by the Office of Management and Budget
aligned with the Republican controlled White House. The Act conferred
this responsibility, which the Court held was "executive" in nature, on the
head of the General Accounting Office, the Comptroller General of the
United States. The office of Comptroller General was created in 1921 and
has historically functioned independently as an auditor of government operations. However, the Court held that Gramm-Rudman-Hollings' use of the
Comptroller General violated the separation of powers because Congress
retained the authority to call for the removal of the Comptroller General
from office. This authority could only be invoked for good cause, and it
required compliance with the bicameralism and presentment requirements
at issue in Chadha. Nevertheless, the theoretical possibility that both
Houses of Congress would vote to fire the Comptroller General, and that
both would vote to override an ensuing presidential veto, was found by the
Court to be sufficient day-to-day control by the Congress so as to disqualify
the Comptroller General from performing executive functions.
The doctrine developed in Buckley, Chadha, and Bowsher prohibits congressional participation in any kind of supervisory restraint on the exercise
of power by administrative agencies. This prohibition is confirmed by the
Court's decision in Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens
for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise.56 By statute, Congress transferred operation of National and Dulles airports to the Metropolitan Washington
Airports Authority, an administrative body created by the authority of Virginia, Maryland, and the District of Columbia under local law. As a condition of the transfer, the three local governments were required to create a
Board of Review with power to oversee the operation of the Airports Authority. The Board of Review was to include among its membership certain
members of Congress, acting in their "individual capacities" as representatives of the flying public. The Court rejected this characterization of those
members and concluded that the Board was a federal instrumentality.
Without determining whether the Board exercised legislative or judicial
power, the Court concluded that it violated the separation of powers in
either case. If it was legislative in nature, then it violated Chadha because
the Board did not employ the constitutionally-defined legislative process. If
its powers were executive, then Bowsher was violated because of congres56.

111 S.Ct. 2298 (1991).
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sional control. To be sure, Congress engaged in a constitutionally dubious
practice here-forcing an agency created by state law to submit to control
by members of Congress ostensibly acting as individuals. The Court's rationale, however, leaves much to be desired. A better reason for invalidating this sham is that Congress retained control to jealously guard its
members' precious District of Columbia area airport privileges. This is aggrandizement of congressional power at the expense of local autonomy.
D.

Executive Control of Administrative Agencies

Supervision of government agencies is a central constitutional function
of the President. He has power to "require the Opinion, in writing, of the
principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject
relating to the Duties of their respective Offices... nominate, and by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate" appoint principal officers of the
United States and appoint inferior officers of the United States as provided
for by Congress." The Constitution also provides that the President "shall
take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed, and shall Commission all
the Officers of the United States."' 58 These provisions, together with the
implied power to remove officials from office, vest the President with primary authority to manage government operations outside the purview of
Congress and the courts.
Historically, Congress has attempted to curtail the President's managerial authority. The impeachment and trial of President Andrew Johnson
represents one of the most extreme examples of such interbranch conflict.
Although the underlying political motivation for the impeachment was retaliation against Johnson's obstruction of the radical Republicans' designs
for Reconstruction, the principal charge against the President was that he
had removed the Secretary of State, William H. Seward, from office without
Senate approval. President Johnson was acquitted by the slimmest of margins in the Senate, but Congress had made its point.
In 1876, contemporaneously with the sellout of Reconstruction in exchange for a term in the White House for Republican Rutherford B. Hayes,
Congress enacted a law which required the President to obtain the advice
and consent of the Senate to remove executive officers, including certain
postmasters, from office. A half-century later this provision was invalidated
by the Supreme Court 9 because it unconstitutionally interfered with the
President's power to terminate executive officers. Then in 1935, the Court
57. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
58. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
59. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
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upheld a provision of the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 restricting
the power of the President to remove commissioners without good cause. 6°
The Court's approval of legislative authority to constrain the power of the
President to remove executive officers is the keystone for the development
of so-called "independent" agencies. 6 ' These agencies enjoy considerable
autonomy because of this legislative check on executive control. Recent
decisions have approved of other legislative measures designed to insulate
administrative agencies from presidential supervision.
In Morrison v. Olson,6 2 the Supreme Court upheld the independent
counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978.63 The Act
provides for the appointment of independent counsel to investigate and
prosecute serious criminal violations by high level executive officials. Upon
the application of the Attorney General, special counsel are appointed by a
special federal court consisting of Article III judges. That court also has
power to define the duties of the independent counsel, terminate the post
when its mission has been completed, and perform certain ministerial functions in connection with the Ethics in Government Act. Most importantly,
independent counsel are insulated from executive supervision, because even
though they are nominally subordinate attorneys assigned to the Department of Justice, they may only be removed from office "by the personal
action of the Attorney General and only for good cause. '
The Court upheld the Act's provisions vesting appointment in a court
because independent counsel are "inferior Officers" whose appointments
may be vested in the "Courts of Law.",65 The special court's other functions
relative to the independent counsel and the Ethics in Government Act were
found not to be "executive" in nature and therefore were inconsequential
with respect to separation of powers considerations. The absolute protection from removal by the President and the limitation on the power of the
Attorney General to remove independent counsel were upheld as well.
In no way did these limitations aggrandize the power of the legislative
or judicial branches at the expense of the executive, nor did they impair the
President in his constitutional duty to "take care that the laws be faithfully
executed." To the contrary, the plan of the independent counsel provisions
60. Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
61. Major independent agencies of the federal government include the Federal Communications Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, the Interstate Commerce Commission, the
National Labor Relations Board, and the Securities and Exchange Commission.
62. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).

63. 28 U.S.C. §§ 49, 591-99 (1988).
64. 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(1) (1988).
65. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
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of the Ethics in Government Act imposes a check on executive branch lawlessness. In the process, though, one check has been exchanged for another:
Independent counsel, operating within the constraints of the Ethics in Government Act, have the power to check executive branch lawlessness; but,
the executive branch has been stripped of substantial power to control operations of the Justice Department. On the facts of Morrison, the balance of
powers is maintained. Independent counsel are not completely free agents;
their activities are monitored by Congress, the court, and to some extent,
the Attorney General. The independence that their special role requires is
achieved without sacrificing all accountability. However, the general principle upon which Morrison relies, that the President's power to remove executive officers may be drastically curtailed, is potentially dangerous. In
other circumstances it could be used to create a "roving commission"
charged to "do good" which would not be answerable to anyone. The Sentencing Reform Act6 6 arguably creates just such a roving commission.
The constitutionality of Federal Sentencing Guidelines promulgated by
the United States Sentencing Commission was upheld in Mistretta v. United
States. 7 The Commission is a body composed of Article III judges and
others said to be "located" in the judicial branch. Its members are appointed by the President with Senate approval and may be removed by the
President, but only for good cause. Thus, the Sentencing Commission is
established in the same manner as other independent administrative agencies. The Sentencing Commission differs insofar as it is designated to be
"located" within the judicial branch.
The Court had little difficulty upholding the constitutionality of the Sentencing Commission under separation of powers principles. The Constitution does not prohibit judges from serving in an administrative capacity and
the particular act of promulgating sentencing guidelines does not demean
the judicial branch. Similarly, the role of the President in appointment and
removal of judicial members of the Sentencing Commission does not significantly impair their independence as judges, nor does it aggrandize the
power of the executive branch. The "location" of an independent agency
within the judicial branch was also upheld, but this finding is more
troubling.
The Court's conclusion that the existence of the Sentencing Commission
neither diminishes the power of the legislature nor aggrandizes the power of
the judiciary is certainly reasonable. The cooperation of all three branches
has always been required in order to fix, impose, and execute a sentence for
66. See supra note 18.
67. 488 U.S. 361 (1989); see also supra notes 16-22 and accompanying text.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:797

a criminal violation. That complex set of relationships has not been fundamentally redefined by the Sentencing Reform Act. However, the idea that
an administrative agency can be "located" within the judicial branch dramatically alters the relationship between the agency and the other branches
as compared with the more familiar independent agencies.
Traditionally, independent agencies were granted considerable autonomy in order to facilitate "rational" administration which might be impaired by excessive political control. To be sure, reliance on the expectation
that principles of rational administration will be self-limiting is risky business. It requires stepped-up legislative vigilance to keep administrative
power within bounds. Where the independent agency is developing the
content of national policy, it almost inevitably commands the attention of
lawmakers and law enforcement officials whose central functions are implicated. The creation of an administrative agency charged with responsibilities other than judicial administration, yet deemed to be "located" within
the judicial branch, is particularly troubling. The agency is secreted away
from the political branches that might otherwise check its exercise of
power. The "executive" powers of the Comptroller General under GrammRudman-Hollings were held unconstitutional because the Comptroller was
"located" within the most peripheral outer compass of legislative control.6 8
The technical task of the Sentencing Commission, to fill in the details of a
sentencing plan in accordance with a congressionally adopted penal philosophy, is indistinguishable from the Comptroller General's tasks under
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, or from the rulemaking function of independent
agencies. The "location" of the Sentencing Commission within the judicial
branch, however, adds a layer of insulation-the cloak of judicial branch
autonomy-between the agency and the political branches, but it results in
no additional judicial check upon its power. Justice Scalia sounded an apt
warning in his dissent in Mistretta, where he stated: "I foresee all manner
of 'expert' bodies, insulatedfrom the political process, to which Congress
will delegate various portions of its lawmaking responsibility." 6 9 The core
difficulty is not, as Justice Scalia contends, that Congress has unconstitutionally transferred its lawmaking power to an administrative agency.
Rather, it is the Commission's configuration as an independent agency
within the judicial branch that has dramatically reduced the institutional
checks upon its work.
In the field of sentencing persons convicted of crime, the constitutional
protection of the individual rights of suspects affords a meaningful check
68. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
69. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 422 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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upon the exercise of governmental power. If, however, Congress can liberate an administrative agency from institutional checks by the simple assertion that it is within the judicial branch, then Justice Scalia's prediction of a
proliferation of expert bodies may be correct. If the Federal Sentencing
Commission can be so insulated, why cannot a judicial branch Commission
for the Advancement of the Common Good, empowered to promulgate
guidelines for the ordering of the regulatory welfare state, enjoy similar
autonomy?
The common thread running through the Court's jurisprudence of separation of powers in recent years has been an unabashed aggressive statism.
The checks and balances that in theory are supposed to limit the power of
government have not been utilized by the Court to keep the power of administrative agencies in check. The Supreme Court's treatment of
statutory
constraints on agency power also reflects this statist philosophy.
II.

STATUTORY CONSTRAINTS

The outer bounds of an administrative agency's power are established
by Congress. Legislation limiting the scope of agency authority takes two
forms. First, agencies must conform their administrative process to the
general requiremekts of the Administrative Procedure Act7" and other federal statutes of broad applicability.7 1 Second, organic statutes that create
agencies and define their jurisdiction impose limits beyond which agency
action is ultra vires.72 Leading Supreme Court decisions have construed
both types of statutory limitations so as to expand the range of agency
discretion.
A.

GeneralStatutory Constraints: Rulemaking Procedures

The Administrative Procedure Act specifies two types of procedures applicable to agency rulemaking and implies the existence of a third. Each of
these alternative processes is characterized by a different degree of formality, ranging from full trial-type formal hearings7 3 to informal "notice-and-

70. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 5372, 7521 (1988).
71. E.g., Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988); Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a
(1988); Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1988); Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 581-591 (1988); Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612 (1988).
72. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (1988) (a reviewing court shall hold unlawful and set aside
agency action found to be in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of
statutory right).

73. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 556, 557 (1988).
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comment" procedures,7 4 and, by implication, even more informal, discretionary rulemaking procedures.7 5
Formal rulemaking procedures are necessary "[w]hen rules are required
by statute to be made on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing."' 76 The Supreme Court definitively construed this language in United
States v. Florida East Coast Railway Co. 7 7 The Court had previously held
that the words "after hearing" in the Interstate Commerce Act 78 are not the
equivalent of a hearing "on the record" under the Administrative Procedure Act. 79 Then, in FloridaEast Coast, in an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, the Court held that the Interstate Commerce Act's "hearing"
requirement does not trigger formal rulemaking under the Administrative
Procedure Act. Although "on the record" is not a term of art required in
all cases to which formal rulemaking applies, the unadorned requirement of
a "hearing" does not evidence congressional intent sufficient to overcme a
strong presumption in favor of informal process for rulemaking. Moreover,
the Interstate Commerce Act's "hearing" requirement could be met by
agency consideration based solely on written submissions in accordance
with informal notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures. Florida East
Coast interprets the Administrative Procedure Act to afford to administrative agencies maximum freedom to choose appropriate procedures for
rulemaking. The Court's decision establishes a presumption favoring less
formal procedural requirements rather than more formal hearings. Additionally, Congress must speak with great precision if it intends to impose
formal rulemaking requirements on an agency.8 0 The word "hearing" does
not in and of itself imply an opportunity to give oral testimony or crossexamine witnesses.
The Court further developed its commitment to relieving agencies of the
constraints imposed by procedural formalities in Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. NaturalResources Defense Council, Inc.8 1 The Natural Resources Defense Council opposed the licensing of the Vermont Yankee nuclear reactor. It argued, inter alia, that the environmental effects of the
nuclear fuel cycle should be taken into account in the cost benefit analysis
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1988).
See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (1988).
5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1988).
410 U.S. 224 (1973).
49 U.S.C. § 11121(a)(1) (1988) (this portion of the Interstate Commerce Act is also

known as the Esch Car Service Act).
79. United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742, 757 (1972).
80. After Florida East Coast, the preferred statutory language should incorporate 5 U.S.C.
§§ 557, 558 by express reference.
81. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
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undertaken in relation to the application for a license. The Atomic Energy
Commission 2 did not hear testimony on this issue. Instead, the Commission commenced informal rulemaking to address the question raised by the
Natural Resources Defense Council. The procedure adopted for the
rulemaking included an opportunity to present both written and oral testimony but barred discovery or cross-examination by participating members
of the public. The Natural Resources Defense Council sought judicial review of the rule that was ultimately adopted. 3
The court of appeals invalidated the rule because it found that it was
based on an inadequately developed factual record.84 The rulemaking provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act provide that "the agency shall
give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making
through submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without
opportunity for oral presentation."8 " The court recognized that this provision affords the agency considerable latitude in choosing appropriate procedures, but it reserved for the reviewing court the role of determining
whether the procedures that were employed actually produced a meaningful dialogue and full ventilation of the issues. On appeal, the court concluded that the rulemaking procedures adopted by the Commission failed
this test. Additionally, the Administrative Procedure Act provides: "After
consideration of the relevant matter presented, the agency shall incorporate
in the rules adopted a concise general statement of their basis and purpose."8 6 The court of appeals ruled that the requirement of a "concise general statement of basis and purpose" is not met if the agency fails to account
for factual material in the rulemaking record that tends to contradict the
final version of the rule. 7 The court did not consider the Commission's
statement of basis and purpose sufficient to justify adoption of the rule over
the objections raised by the Natural Resources Defense Council.
The central thesis of the appellate court's decision is that the rulemaking provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act impose substantive
standards that reviewing courts are bound to apply when evaluating the
validity of an agency rulemaking process. The Supreme Court rejected this
82. Later in the course of this controversy, the pertinent powers of the Atomic Energy Commission were transferred to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission under the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974. 42 U.S.C. § 5841(f) (1.988).
83. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 547 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
84. Id. at 655.
85. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1988).
86. Id.

87. Natural Resources Defense Council, 547 F.2d at 646.
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thesis. Justice Rehnquist stated: "Absent constitutional constraints or extremely compelling circumstances the administrative agencies should be
free to fashion their own rules of procedure and to pursue methods of inquiry capable of permitting them to discharge their multitudinous duties.""8
The Administrative Procedure Act establishes the maximum level of procedures that courts may impose on agency rulemaking.8 9 The Act allows oral
or written submission and does not require discovery or cross-examination.
The reviewing court is powerless to invalidate rulemaking that complies
with the statutory minimum. In Vermont Yankee, the Commission employed rulemaking procedures that were considerably more than the bare
minimum required by the Administrative Procedure Act. Therefore, the
nuclear fuel cycle rules adopted by the Commission were not procedurally
deficient. According to the Supreme Court, any other standard of review of
procedural defects would result in confusion, unpredictability of judicial review, adoption by agencies of unduly elaborate procedures to avoid reversal, and, ultimately, distortion or dislocation of the legislative will as
expressed in the Administrative Procedure Act and the organic laws governing regulatory agencies.
Vermont Yankee and Florida East Coast both require deference to
agency choices of rules of procedure. The Court's approval of informality is
not in itself in conflict with the Administrative Procedure Act. Rejection of
artificial formalism is a central tenet of modem administrative law. Informality may produce useful dialogue and free exchange of information
which is the life blood of a regulatory agency. However, in these decisions
the Court upheld informality where it was used to limit and suppress the
free flow of information and ideas. In doing so, the Court substantially
limited the procedural constraint imposed on agencies by the Administrative Procedure Act.
The third and least formal type of rulemaking procedures involves those
procedures entirely exempted from the notice-and-comment requirements
of the Administrative Procedure Act. 90 The procedures employed by agencies for such discretionary rulemaking have not been closely examined by
the Supreme Court. To the extent that the Court has encountered lower
88. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc., 435
U.S. 519, 543 (1978) (quoting FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 290 (1965), and FCC v. Pottsville
Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 143 (1940)).
89. Arguably, Vermont Yankee stands for the more general proposition that courts are not
free to impose greater procedural requirements than those found in the Administrative Procedure
Act on any agency process, including adjudications. See Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 103

(1981).
90. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(a)(l)-(2), 553(b)(A)-(B) (1988).
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court rulings interpreting exemptions from notice-and-comment procedures, it seems unperturbed by generous accommodations of agency discretion." With respect to agency interpretations themselves, as opposed to the
procedures employed in formulating interpretive rules, the Court has expanded the sphere of agency discretion dramatically in recent years.
B. Specific Statutory Constraints: Interpretive Rules After Chevron
Agencies are created by organic statutes that define their jurisdiction,
purposes, and means. Such statutes impose a direct restraint on the legitimate power of administrative agencies. To insure conformity with these
statutory constraints, an agency must continually interpret the particulars
of its organic law. Because of agencies' familiarity with the statutes they
administer, agency interpretations are entitled to respect. Nevertheless, interpretation of legally binding language is an art within the traditional expertise of courts. 92 Consequently, until quite recently, agency interpretive
rules were thought to be subject to independent review by courts. 93 The
Supreme Court in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NaturalResources Defense Council, Inc.," toppled this understanding and replaced it with a rule requiring
judicial deference to agency interpretive rules.
The question raised in Chevron was whether, and to what extent, the
statutory term "stationary source" in the Clean Air Act incorporates the
"bubble concept," which allows aggregating facilities into a single source
for the purpose of measuring net emissions. 95 This is arguably a policy determination of the kind that Congress intended to leave to the discretion of
the Environmental Protection Agency. Because it rested on what was essentially a matter of statutory interpretation, the court of appeals independently re-examined the matter and concluded that the agency had
employed the bubble concept incorrectly. The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that when Congress has not spoken to the precise question, or has
91. See, eg., McCown v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 796 F.2d 151 (6th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1037 (1987) (Health and Human Services determination that federal black
lung benefits are workers' compensation for purposes of disability offset held to be clearly interpretive and exempt from notice-and-comment procedures); American Postal Workers Union, AFLCIO v. United States Postal Serv., 707 F.2d 548 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100
(1984) (change in annuity computation formula affecting thousands of retirees held interpretive);
see also Air Transp. Ass'n of Am. v. Department of Transp., 111 S. Ct. 944 (1991), vacating as
moot 900 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
92. See Great N. R. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285, 291 (1922); see also United
States v. Western Pac. Ry. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 76 (1956) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
93. See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milholin, 444 U.S. 555 (1980).
94. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
95. Id. at 841-42.
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done so ambiguously, reviewing courts are required to defer to an agency's
permissible construction of the governing statute.9 6 In other words, the
court is not free to substitute its interpretation for that of the agency.
Chevron did not represent a massive departure from the conventional
view that deference to agency policy determinations within the ambit of the
agency's competence is required by the expression of congressional will in
the organic law and the principle of separation of powers. The Chevron
doctrine, however, as developed in subsequent decisions, has proven to be
just such a departure. In the term after deciding Chevron, the Court required deference to an agency interpretation of statutory language that was
an express limitation on the agency's jurisdiction.9 7 Thus, the agency became the final judge of the scope of its own power.98 A year later, the
Court, after reaching the rather dubious conclusion that a statutory provision was ambiguous, held that deference was required on a matter involving
pure statutory construction.9 9
In contrast, there have been several decisions in which the Court has
found an agency's interpretation of a statute to be impermissible. For example, in 1986, two years after Chevron, the Court invalidated the Federal
Reserve Board's attempt to regulate "nonbank" banks because it was contrary to the "plain language" of the applicable statute."° The following
term, the Court held that it was unreasonable for the Attorney General to
equate proof of "a well-founded fear of persecution" with proof that "it is
more likely than not that the alien would be subject to persecution." 10 1 In
1986, the Court explained that reviewing courts were not required to give
deference to agency "litigating positions" that were not supported by "regulations, rulings, or administrative practice."' 0 2 Most recently, the Court
rejected an interpretation of Title VII by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission that was contrary to a long-standing presumption that
legislation does not have extra-territorial effect.' 03 Despite these examples

96. Id. at 866.
97. Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116 (1985).
98. For other examples of deference to agency interpretations of the scope of their own jurisdiction, see Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 380-81
(1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) and cases cited therein.
99. Young v. Community Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974 (1986).
100. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 371
(1986).
101. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 423 (1987).
102. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212-13 (1988).
103. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., Ill S. Ct. 1227 (1991); Rust v. Sullivan, Ill S. Ct.
1759, 1778-79 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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where deference was not required, the Chevron doctrine tends to engulf
questions concerning the powers of administrative agencies.
Perhaps the best example of how the Chevron doctrine has taken on the
visage of an all-encompassing imperial command is Dole v. United Steelworkers of America.1 4 The case involved workplace safety regulations concerning disclosure about hazardous substances found at job sites. The
agency promulgated regulations specifying the form of disclosures that employers were required to give to their employees. These were successfully
challenged in court,105 and the agency issued modified regulations to comply with the order of the court of appeals. The new warning regulations
were then modified by the Office of Management and Budget pursuant to its
review under the Paperwork Reduction Act.106 Before the Supreme Court,
the entire case was reduced to a debate over whether the Paperwork Reduction Act applied to agency regulations requiring disclosure of information
to a person other than the government. Both Justice Brennan's opinion for
the Court, and Justice White's dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice
Rehnquist joined, employed the methodology set forth in Chevron. Justice
Brennan concluded that the plain meaning of the Act was that it did not
apply to third party disclosures. Therefore, the Office of Management and
Budget was not entitled to deference. Justice White opined that the statute
was silent on the question of third party disclosure. Consequently, the Office of Management and Budget's interpretation was entitled to deference if
it was reasonable, which he thought it was. This struggle over the proper
application of the Chevron doctrine was entirely misplaced.
Dole should never have become a dispute about the clarity or ambiguity
of the Paperwork Reduction Act in relation to disclosure of information to
persons other than the government. Two sentences deeply embedded
within the opinion of the Court reveal what the case is really about. At one
point the Court stated: "OMB disapproved these provisions based on its
determination that the requirements were not necessary to protect employees." ' 7 Elsewhere, the Court provides the answer to this assertion of
power: "[T]here is no indication in the Paperwork Reduction Act that
OMB is authorized to determine the usefulness of agency-adopted warning
requirements to those being warned."'' 0 8 Nothing else was needed to decide
the case. The authority to rule on the adequacy of safety warnings is a
matter that is self-evidently in the competence and statutory jurisdiction of
104. 494 U.S. 26 (1990).
105.
106.
107.
108.

United Steelworkers of Am. v. Pendergrass, 819 F.2d 1263 (3d Cir. 1987).
Dole, 494 U.S. at 30-32.
Id at 30.
Id at 39.
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the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. The Office of Management and Budget's opinion as to the effectiveness of warnings was unrelated
to its information management function under the Paperwork Reduction
Act. Moreover, the paperwork burdens associated with a requirement to
give warnings ought not to be a factor in an inexpert agency's evaluation of
the warnings' adequacy or effectiveness. If the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration deems it necessary to repeat warnings for the protection of workers, the Office of Management and Budget is without jurisdiction to determine that once is enough. The rather abstract inquiry as to
whether Congress had spoken clearly in the Paperwork Reduction Act to
the question of third person disclosure of information was simply beside the
point. The Chevron doctrine has vested agencies with considerable power
to interpret the legislative standards that are supposed to confine their policy-making discretion. Additionally, after Chevron, agencies have wide latitude to make final determinations about who comes within the coverage of
a statute, what the statute requires of those who are subject to regulation,
and the timing and method of agency enforcement. Chevron turns the nondelegation doctrine on its head. To the extent that a statute is ambiguous,
or standardless, the reviewing court is required to defer to agency interpretations. More disturbing is the fact that the Chevron doctrine diverts substantive controversies about individual rights and governmental power into
an abstract discourse about statutory interpretation, and thence to deferential treatment of agency conclusions. Chevron stood for respect for the congressionally mandated allocation of power between agencies and reviewing
courts, but the doctrine that evolved after Chevron produces an opposite
result. Agency irresponsibility is easily masked by a ceremonial nod in the
direction of Chevron and a complete abdication of the judicial role.
The softening of the Court's jurisprudence of administrative procedure
and statutory interpretation has occurred in tandem with its statist approach to separation of powers. The Court's approach to the protection of
individual rights through constitutionally mandated administrative procedures has followed a similar path.

III.

FAIRNESS: PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantees basic fairness. Generally, when special burdens of agency action are imposed on individuals or groups in consequence of past facts, due process requires that
the persons affected be afforded a meaningful opportunity to participate in
the decisionmaking process. The distinction between those situations in
which due process requires an opportunity to be heard, and those in which
political representation is deemed adequate to protect the interests of af-
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fected persons, has never been clear.0 9 The generality of the burden, the
number of persons affected, and referability to past or future facts are in-

dicators of the need for individualized due process, but no systematic formulation has been followed.' 10
Today, the threshold question for due process claims is whether the
claimant has asserted the deprivation of a protected interest.'
Once that
threshold has been passed, the analysis of constitutionally required procedures follows the balancing test articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge.1

2

The

test involves comparative consideration of individual and governmental interests with due regard to the risk of error and the value of additional

procedures.
The importance of the Mathews test is its relativization of rights. Earlier interpretations of the Administrative Procedure Act required formal
adjudicatory procedures whenever the Constitution required a hearing. 13
At that time, the availability of constitutional due process protections
turned on the distinction between rights (life, liberty, and property) and
privileges (government largess).

4

The Court's reliance on the distinction

between rights and privileges eroded during the 1950s and 1960s,1 15 and
1 16
was eventually discarded in the landmark decision of Goldberg v. Kelly.
In that case, the Court held that uninterrupted receipt of welfare benefits
under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program was an enti109. Compare Londoner v. City and County of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908) with Bi-Metallic
Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
110. The Administrative Procedure Act employs the distinction between rulemaking and adjudication to provide a framework for analysis of the claim of an individual to participate in
agency process. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(4)-(7), 553-554 (1988). Ordinarily, fairness dictates that
individuals should have an opportunity to be heard in an adjudication but not in rulemaking.
However, this framework allows for numerous exceptions, and in any event it is not co-extensive
with the requirement of procedural due process under the Fifth Amendment.
111. See Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988) (civilian employee of the
Navy does not have a right to a security clearance which is a prerequisite to continued employment, and therefore does not have a right to a hearing on the denial of security clearance);
O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Ctr., 447 U.S. 773 (1980) (recipients of Medicare and Medicaid
benefits do not have a right to receive benefits to stay in an uncertified facility, and therefore do
not have a right to intervene in decertification proceedings).
112. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
113. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 36 (1950).
114. Id at 50.
115. See Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S.
123, 164-69 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 184-86 (Jackson, J., concurring); see also
Gonzalez v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (opinion of the court written by then Circuit
Judge, later Chief Justice, Warren Burger); see generally Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73
YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
116. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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tlement subject to the constitutional requirement of due process of law." 7
To be sure, the rejection of the idea that welfare is a mere "gratuity" was an
important expansion of the conception of due process. However, Goldberg
itself did not revamp the form of analysis employed to evaluate the constitutional adequacy of procedures. It simply added a new category of individual interests to the existing catalogue of liberty and property interests.
Under Goldberg, once a legitimate claim of entitlement to a government
benefit has been established, the contours of the right to be heard are fixed
by a traditional due process analysis." 8 Mathews v. Eldridge changed all
that. The Court's post-Mathews treatment of procedural due process claims
regarding the timeliness of hearings and decisions, and the problem of
agency non-acquiescence to binding judicial precedents, illustrates the
changes.
The question of timing-"When is process due?"-was formerly resolved by reference to a presumption favoring hearings prior to detrimental
governmental action unless there existed an overriding necessity to postpone hearings until afterwards. 1 9 After Mathews, there is no longer any
such presumption. Rather, the proper question is whether a pre-deprivation hearing is necessary to prevent erroneous governmental action, and
whether the burden on the government of such a hearing is tolerable. In
Mathews, the Court ruled that the Constitution does not require a hearing
prior to the termination of Social Security disability benefits because the
risk of error was slight 2 ° and the relative burden on the Social Security
system would be great. Moreover, the severity of the impact of the deprivation on the individual claimant is not the correct measure of the private
interest to be weighed in the balance. Rather, the constitutional sufficiency
of agency procedures must be judged as applied to what Justice Rehnquist
called in a later decision, "the run-of-the-mine case."' 12 1 Thus, the former
presumption is reversed: If the government chooses to afford only postdeprivation process, the individual claimant must meet the burden of estab22
lishing the need for pre-deprivation process under the Mathews analysis.1

117. Id. at 261-63.
118. See Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
119. See North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908).
120. In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on a distinction between the "objective"
evidence in medical reports used to determine disability and the "subjective" impressions of a
caseworker relied on to determine eligibility for Aid to Families with Dependent Children. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 343-44.
121. Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 330 (1985).
122. See Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 696 (1979).
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A decision that is unreasonably delayed may be as subversive of individual rights as a failure to provide an opportunity to be heard at all. The
Supreme Court has held that nine months is not unconstitutionally lengthy
in the absence of proof that the delay was unreasonably prolonged. 2 3 This
constitutional standard of reasonableness has been incorporated into federal
124
legislation as well.

The Court has appeared reluctant to enforce the right to an agency determination without undue delay. In Heckler v. Day, 2 5 a class action was
brought on behalf of present or future Social Security disability claimants in
Vermont challenging unreasonable delays in processing claims and considering and deciding appeals from denials of benefits. A statewide injunction
was granted ordering the agency to decide claims within 180 days or else
pay interim benefits. The government did not contest the claim of unreasonable delay as to the named plaintiffs in the suit. Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court ruled that the injunction exceeded the remedial powers of
the court below because Congress had elected a flexible reasonableness standard instead of a fixed time frame. The difficulty with this decision is that it
forecloses the possibility of anticipatory relief. If the only remedy for unreasonable delay is a petition to a court to compel a decision that has already been unreasonably delayed, there is no possibility of meaningful
relief. If a statute or the Constitution guarantees a right to a timely decision, that right is meaningful only if there is some mechanism to prevent
delay. The Court's decision in Heckler v. Day denies access to preventive
remedies. It should be noted, however, that the Court has not been com12 6
pletely indifferent to claims of unreasonable delay. In one recent case,
the Court relieved a claimant of the duty to exhaust a remedy with the
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, stating that the "claim
has essentially been relegated to a 'black hole' from which it may not
emerge before the statute of limitations on [the claimant's] state law claims
has run."

127

The exhaustion requirement has been employed by the Court to short
circuit claims of procedural unfairness and agency obstructionism. In
Heckler v. Ringer,128 Medicare claimants sought a judicial remedy for unduly burdensome procedural requirements. Three claimants who had un123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
(1992).
128.

See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 547 (1985).
See 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (1988).
467 U.S. 104 (1984).
Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FSLIC, 489 U.S. 561 (1989).
Id. at 586. A similar result was reached in McCarthy v. Madigan, 112 S.Ct. 1081
466 U.S. 602 (1984).
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dergone surgery sought relief because action by the Secretary of Health and
Human Services effectively forced them to pursue a course of administrative
appeals, the final outcome of which, they claimed, would clearly be in their
favor. In other words, they claimed to be victims of abusive procedural
manipulation by the agency. The Court, in an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, discarded the claimants' procedural due process challenge in a footnote. 129 Instead, it treated their action as a claim for benefits and dismissed
it for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The effect of this disposition of the case on the three who had undergone surgery was to deny any
meaningful hearing on the allegations of agency misconduct.
A fourth claimant in Ringer sought review of action by the Secretary,
which made it practically impossible for him to have the surgery that the
others had already undergone. The Secretary had determined, by rule, that
this particular procedure was not "reasonable and necessary" for patients
with Ringer's condition. In the wake of this ruling, Ringer was unable to
find a doctor to perform the operation because he could not afford to pay
for the surgery. The Court held that Ringer, too, was essentially claiming a
right to receive benefits, which could only be considered by a court after
undergoing the procedure, presenting a claim for payment, and exhausting
administrative remedies. Only then could he obtain a judicial determination of the legality of the Secretary's ruling on the necessity of the procedure. The surgery in question, bilateral carotid body resection, may be a
controversial treatment for respiratory distress.' 3 ° Nevertheless, whether
the ruling was a permissible application of the "reasonable and necessary"
standard mandated by statute is certainly an arguable point. By requiring
Ringer to have surgery that he cannot afford, the Court insulated the Secretary's ruling from meaningful review and denied Ringer an opportunity to
be heard on the effective denial of Medicare coverage.
The problem of agency non-acquiescence to binding judicial precedents
became a hallmark of the Social Security system during the early 1980s.
The evident policy of the Administration was to conserve resources by placing obstacles in the path of Social Security claimants without regard to
whether they were eligible or not. This disgraceful policy garnered the attention of Congress and reforms were instituted in 1984.3 In the
meantime, countless disabled Americans had been shamefully mistreated by
129. Id. at 610 n.7. But see MeNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 111 S. Ct. 888 (1991)
(procedural due process claim was not precluded by statute limiting right of review). Chief Justice
Rehnquist, relying on Ringer, dissented. Id. at 899.

130. Ringer, 466 U.S. at 607 n.3.
131. See The Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984, 42 U.S.C. § 423(f)-(g)

(1988).
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their government. In Schweiker v. Chilicky,'3 2 plaintiffs styled a Bivens13 3
type action to obtain redress for the effects of this systematic and lawless
unfairness. The Supreme Court denied recovery on the grounds that Congress had provided the sole remedies for claims arising under the carefully
reticulated scheme of the social security laws. The Court's opinion by Justice O'Connor interpreted congressional silence on the availability of a damage remedy for procedural abuses as a "factor counselling hesitation" 13' 4
before the Court would recognize a private right of action implied by the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. In the final analysis, the
Court conceded: "The trauma to respondents, and thousands of others like
them, must surely have gone beyond what anyone of normal sensibilities
would wish to see imposed on innocent disabled citizens." 3 ' Nevertheless,
since Congress did not include a damage remedy in its legislative response
to agency misconduct, the claimants were denied the fair treatment that the
Due Process Clause is supposed to guarantee.
The Court's unfriendliness to claims based on the constitutional right to
procedural due process means that this important source of individual
rights does not function as a meaningful check on the power of administrative agencies. 13 6 Considerations of fairness to the individual, like structural
and statutory constraints, depend on access to courts in order to be effective. In recent years, the Supreme Court has moved to block such access.
IV.

JUDICIAL REVIEW

review"'1 37

The "generous
provisions of the Administrative Procedure
Act 13 1 install reviewing courts as an integral step in the administrative process. The ultimate judicial examination of exercises of power by administrative agencies provides a measure of assurance that the overall process has
132. 487 U.S. 412 (1988).

133. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388

(1971).
134. Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 421 (citing Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396, quoting Bell v. Hood, 327
U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).
135. Id. at 428-29.
136. Other individual rights have proven to be similarly ineffectual to constrain agency
power. See, eg., Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S.Ct. 1759 (1991) (rejecting claims based on First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and association); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988) (rejecting Establishment Clause claim); see also Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors,
473 U.S. 305 (1985) (treating First Amendment claim as indistinguishable from procedural due
process claim which was rejected).
137. "The Administrative Procedure Act's 'generous review provisions' must be given a 'hospitable' interpretation." Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140-41 (1967) (quoting Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 51 (1955)).

138. 5 U.S.C §§ 701-706 (1988).
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been conducted with regularity and due deliberation. Premature or overly
intrusive judicial review of agency action may subvert an agency's legitimate authority and thereby frustrate the will of Congress and contravene
the separation of powers. To prevent judicial usurpation of agency power, a
number of doctrines have been developed that restrict access to courts for
parties seeking review of agency action. These doctrines together constitute
an obstacle course of abstract and incoherent rules which, because of their
jurisdictional character, may be invoked at any stage of the proceedings.
The Supreme Court has been active in recent years shaping the course of
development of three of these doctrines: standing, statutory preclusion, and
action which is unreviewable because it is committed by law to agency
discretion.
A.

Standing

The requirements for standing to obtain judicial review of agency action
are based on an Administrative Procedure Act provision which states: "A
person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected
or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is
entitled to judicial review thereof." 13 9 The leading decision supplying a judicial gloss on this language is Association of Data ProcessingService Organizations, Inc. v. Camp."4 The opinion of the Court by Justice Douglas
begins by conceding the incoherence of the standing doctrine: "Generalizations about standing to sue are largely worthless as such."' 4 1 He then sets
forth a two-part test for standing. First, the claimant must allege an injuryin-fact. Second, the claimant must be arguably within the zone-of-interests
sought to be protected by the legal provision relied upon. The DataProcessing test has been revisited by the Court in several recent decisions which
explain each of its prongs.
The operation of the zone-of-interests requirement is revealed by a comparison of Clarke v. SecuritiesIndustry Ass'n 142 to Air CourierConference of
America v. American Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO.'4 3 In Clarke, Justice White, writing for the Court, relied on the general presumption of reviewability of agency action'" to limit the sweep of the zone-of-interests
limitation on standing. The Court stated that
139. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988).
140. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
141. Id. at 151.

142. 479 U.S. 388 (1987).
143. 111 S.Ct. 913 (1991).
144. See Abbott Lab. v. Gamer, 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
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[i]n cases where the plaintiff is not itself the subject of the contested
regulatory action, the test denies a right of review if the plaintiff's
interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot145reasonably be assumed
that Congress intended to permit the suit.
Applying this standard, the Court sustained the standing of securities dealers to obtain review of agency action alleged to be in violation of laws regulating commercial banking. Significantly, Justice Stevens, with whom Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor joined, 14" concurred in part, 4 7 but
did not join in what he referred to as the majority's "wholly unnecessary
exegesis on the zone-of-interest's test."'1 48 Justice Stevens was satisfied that
the banking laws in question were, in part, intended to regulate the market
power of banking institutions, and that competitors of those institutions,
with respect to non-bank businesses, had standing to sue because they were
within that broadly defined zone-of-interests. Notwithstanding Justice Stevens' protestations that "[t]here will be time enough to deal with the broad
issues surrounding that test when a case requires us to do so,"1 49 in practical effect he reached the same result as the majority using a more restrictive
zone-of-interests analysis.
The more restrictive approach was followed by Chief Justice Rehnquist
in Air CourierConference. Labor organizations representing postal employees sought review of a decision of the United States Postal Service to allow
certain private carriers to compete with the Post Office in providing certain
international services. They claimed that this arrangement violated the
statutes that create the federal government's monopoly in the carriage of
first class mail. The appeals court held that the postal workers had standing under Clarke because a broad reading of the laws governing the United
States Postal Service included labor relations with its employees. 5 ° The
Supreme Court reversed and distinguished Clarke on the grounds that the
general banking laws which protected the interests of securities dealers were
closely related to the statutory provision that formed the basis of the complaint. However, in Air Courier Conference, the Court rejected the notion
that the general codification of postal statutes establishes a connection between the provisions dealing with labor relations and those concerned with
145. Clarke, 479 U.S. at 399.
146. Justice Scalia did not participate.
147. Clarke, 479 U.S. at 409 (Stevens, J., concurring).
148. Id. at 410.
149. Id. at 417.
150. American Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO v. United States Postal Serv., 891 F.2d 304
(D.C. Cir. 1989).
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the postal monopoly sufficient to bring the postal workers within the zone
of interests of the relevant statute.
It is noteworthy that the Court in Air Courier Conference did not adopt
the Clarke formulation, "so marginally related to or inconsistent with the
purposes implicit in the statute."' 51 Arguably, that standard would have
required a different result. The postal workers' interest in challenging allegedly unlawful authorization of private courier services is analogous to the
interest of a labor union in preventing an employer from subcontracting
work to a non-union shop. There is a special relationship between the collective bargaining representatives of postal workers and the United States
Postal Service. Actions by the Postal Service that have a significant impact
on that relationship are a matter of direct and immediate concern to postal
workers. It is therefore doubtful that such action is "so marginally related
to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot
reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit."' 5 2 The
Court asserted that this sort of analysis "conflates the zone-of-interests test
with injury in fact."' 5 3 This assessment would be more plausible in the
absence of the special relationship between the Postal Service and the unions. In light of that relationship, Air Courier Conference must be understood as reflective of the Supreme Court's move toward a less hospitable
interpretation of the generous review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act than it embraced in earlier decisions.
The Court has moved to constrict the injury-in-fact prong of the Data
Processing test as well. In Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation,54 the
Court imposed an extremely demanding test for standing to challenge policies of the Bureau of Land Management. The National Wildlife Federation
charged the government with illegally undertaking a "land withdrawal review program"' 5 5 that resulted in opening up wilderness areas to mining.
These actions were alleged to have injured members of the National
Wildlife Federation who claimed use of lands covered by, and in the vicinity
of, tracts subject to the agency's "program." This allegation of specific injury is required by Sierra Club v. Morton.1 5 6 In that case, the Sierra Club
sought to avoid alleging specific facts about its members' use of the Mineral
King Valley because it feared that any relief would then be limited to re151. Clarke, 479 U.S. at 399.
152. Id.

153. Air Courier Conference of Am. v. American Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO, 111 S.
Ct. 913, 918 (1991).
154. 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990).

155. Id. at 3182.
156. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
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dressing the precise injury alleged in the complaint. The Supreme Court's
decision in Sierra Club dismissed that apprehension by holding that once a
party has alleged facts sufficient to establish standing, it can then argue all
pertinent legal questions, including the public interest in governmental
compliance with the applicable law. In Lujan, the Court places complainants precisely in the frustrating position that the Sierra Club had feared.
Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court characterized the Bureau of Land
Management's "program" as a case-by-case approach to carrying out the
agency's mandate; in effect, no "program" exists other than in the pleadings
of the National Wildlife Federation. It then required the allegation of specific injury with respect to each of the 1250 individual classifications that
constituted the putative "program." Requiring such proof to obtain standing to challenge a government policy revealed by a course of practice of an
administrative agency effectively insulates the agency from meaningful review of the legality of its policies. In light of the recent history of agency
non-acquiescence in the Social Security system, it is doubtful whether the
Bureau of Land Management would conform its practices to the outcome
of a small number of test cases. It should be emphasized that this is a
problem of legal immunization of the administrative agency rather than a
matter of political sour grapes. The National Wildlife Federation sued to
contest the legality, not merely the wisdom, of the government's policy.
The Supreme Court's decision renders such challenges all but impossible.'
B.

Statutory Preclusion

Judicial review under the terms of the Administrative Procedure Act is
unavailable where statutes preclude review. 5 Consistent with the strong
presumption of reviewability of administrative action, 59 the Court has
often strictly construed statutes which preclude review." 6 The standard

157. The Court did allow an action seeking programmatic relief to go forward in a case involving constitutional claims. McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 111 S. Ct. 888 (1991).
158. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1) (1988).
159. See Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
160. See, e.g., McNary, 111 S. Ct. 888 (preclusion of review -under amnesty provisions of the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 does not preclude constitutional claims); Traynor
v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535 (1988) (preclusion of review of claims for Veterans' benefits does not
preclude review of decision of the Board of Veterans Appeals arising under the Rehabilitation
Act); Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667 (1986) (review of Medicare reimbursement regulations not precluded by statute limiting right of review of claims determinations); Lindahl v. Office of Personnel Management, 470 U.S. 768 (1985) (provision precluding review of decisions of the Merit Systems Protection Board limited by case law of which Congress was aware at the time of enactment); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974) (preclusion of
review of decisions of the Veterans' Administration does not include constitutional claims).
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the Court has applied in these cases requires a showing of" 'clear and convincing evidence' of congressional intent ...before a statute will be construed to restrict access to judicial review." 161
Recently, the Court has introduced a new and less accommodating standard into its analysis of statutory preclusion. In Community Nutrition In1 63
stitute v. Block,162 Justice O'Connor, writing for a unanimous Court,
stated: "This Court has.., never applied the 'clear and convincing evidence' standard in the strict evidentiary sense .... Rather, the Court has
found the standard met, and the presumption favoring judicial review overcome, whenever the congressional intent to preclude judicial review is
'fairly discernible in the statutory scheme.' ",u The Court's shift from
strict construction of statutes precluding review under the "clear and convincing evidence" standard, to the new "fairly discernible" standard is
significant.
In Block, the statute in question was the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937,165 under which the Secretary of Agriculture has the
power to issue orders to control the price and supply of milk. The Act gave
producers a right of review of milk market orders, and early on the
Supreme Court held that the Act implied a similar right of review at the
behest of handlers.166 The Community Nutrition Institute asserted a similar right on the part of consumers. The district court dismissed for lack of
standing. On appeal, the court held that individual consumers had standing, but the organizational plaintiff did not. 1 67 Circuit Judge Antonin
Scalia concurred in part and dissented in part, opining that consumers did
not have standing to sue under the Act. 168 Judge Scalia drew a distinction
between "a direct and immediate beneficiary class"' 169 which comes within
the zone of interests sought to be protected by the statute, and those "indirect general beneficiaries" who do not.1 70 On his reading, the interest of
consumers in proper enforcement of the statute was so general as to be
161. Robison, 415 U.S. at 373-74 (quoting Abbott Lab., 387 U.S. at 141).
162. 467 U.S. 340 (1984).
163. Justice Stevens did not participate.

164. Block, 467 U.S. at 350-51 (quoting Association of Data Processing Serv. Org. v. Camp,
397 U.S. 150, 157(1970)). Here Justice O'Connor relies on a rather obscure portion of the Data
Processing decision, which, of course, is centrally significant for its holding on standing rather
than preclusion.
165.

7 U.S.C. §§ 601-624 (1988).

166. Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288 (1944).
167. Community Nutrition Inst. v. Block, 698 F.2d 1239 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
168. Id. at 1255 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
169. Id. at 1257.

170. Id.

1992]

THE SUPREME COURT AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

831

insufficient to support standing for members of that class. In the Supreme
Court, Judge Scalia's zone-of-interests analysis was transformed into preclusion analysis. The reason for this is not difficult to surmise. The regulation of the marketing of milk throughout the twentieth century has been
predicated on a supposed need to insure a reliable supply of wholesome
milk to consumers amidst the uncertainties of freely competitive markets.
It seems incongruous to conclude that consumers are not arguably within
the zone-of-interests sought to be protected by the Act simply because the
legislative objective was advanced by affording special regulatory protection
to producers. Under the Act, consumers are not injured by milk market
orders simply because they cause prices to rise, but they nevertheless are
keenly interested in the legality of the Secretary's actions relative to a statute which provides for the regulation of an important consumer commodity. Consequently, the Supreme Court declined to adopt Judge Scalia's
analysis of standing and turned to preclusion instead.
Justice O'Connor's preclusion analysis is doubly confusing. First, it
turns the zone-of-interests test on its head. In the context of determining
whether a party has standing, the presumption of reviewability requires a
broadly inclusive construction of the zone of interests arguably protected by
the statute. Such a broadly inclusive construction, when applied to preclusion analysis, has the perverse effect of expanding the class of persons precluded from obtaining judicial review because an intent to preclude judicial
review is fairly discernible. Second, the Court uses preclusion to answer
what is quintessentially the question of standing: Is the plaintiff a proper
party to bring this claim? By legerdemain, Justice O'Connor submerges
Judge Scalia's questionable zone-of-interests analysis and allows it to resurface disguised as a preclusion question: Did Congress intend to preclude
consumer lawsuits? The Court concluded that such an intention was fairly
discernible: "The Act contemplates a cooperative venture among the Secretary, producers, and handlers; consumer participation is not provided for or
desired under the complex scheme enacted by Congress. Consumer suits
would undermine the congressional preference for administrative remedies
and provide a mechanism for disrupting administration of the congressional
, 171
scheme."
The Court's conclusion in Block was based entirely on inferences drawn
from the structure of the legislative scheme. This approach was followed in
United States v. Fausto.172 The question was whether government employees who do not have a right of administrative or judicial review under the
171. Community Nutrition Inst. v. Block, 467 U.S. 340, 352 (1984).
172. 484 U.S. 439 (1988).
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Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 are precluded from obtaining an alternative remedy in the Court of Claims. Justice Scalia's opinion looked to both
the purpose and the structure of the Act and found:
It seems to us evident that the absence of provision for these employees to obtain judicial review is not an uninformative consequence of
the limited scope of the statute, but rather a manifestation of a considered congressional judgment that they should not have statutory
entitlement to review of adverse action of the type governed by
Chapter 75.173
The Court found in the "preferred position of certain categories of employees," and in the primacy of the Merit System Protection Board "for administrative resolution of disputes over adverse personnel action," structural
elements of the Act that would be undermined by allowing Fausto's action
in the Court of Claims.1 74 Congressional intent to preclude judicial review
was fairly discernible from the purposes and structure of the Civil Service
Reform Act.
The distinction between the "clear and convincing evidence" standard
and the "fairly discernible" standard is self-evident. In cases like Fausto
and Block, the only thing that was clear in the actual legislation was that
Congress had not anticipated the precise question at hand. In earlier decisions, the Court relied on a presumption of reviewability to resolve such
doubts. Today, the Court seems increasingly willing to infer from congressional silence an intent to deprive aggrieved persons of their day in court.
C. Action Committed to Agency Discretion
The Administrative Procedure Act does not afford a right of judicial
review of action that is committed by law to agency discretion. 17' The
Supreme Court articulated the contemporary understanding of this provision in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park Inc. v. Volpe. 176 Justice Marshall,
quoting from the legislative history, stated that action is committed to
agency discretion "in those rare instances where 'statutes are drawn in such
broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply.' ,177 The leading
178
decision applying this construction is Heckler v. Chaney.
173. Id. at 448-49. "Chapter 75 of the Act governs adverse action taken against employees

for the 'efficiency of the service,' which includes action of the type taken here, based on misconduct." Id. at 446.
174. Id. at 449.

175.
176.
177.
178.

5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1988).
401 U.S. 402 (1971).
Id. at 410 (quoting S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. § 26 (1945)).
470 U.S. 821 (1985).
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In Chaney, inmates sentenced to death by lethal injection sought to
compel the Food and Drug Administration to pursue enforcement of the
misbranding provisions of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
against states which use drugs for lethal injection. Their position was that
this was an unapproved use of an approved drug, and that the distribution
and use of such drugs for capital punishment should be enjoined. Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the majority, characterized as "implausible" the notion that the Food and Drug Administration "is required to exercise its
enforcement power to ensure that States only use drugs that are 'safe and
17 9
effective' for human execution."
Though the regulatory requirement of safety and effectiveness may
sound strange as applied to executions, it is hardly implausible. So-called
"humane" punishments replaced torture in the eighteenth century. 18 0 The
guillotine, electric chair, and gas chamber were each supposedly designed to
produce a quicker and less painful death. The same supposition accompanied the introduction of lethal injection for executions. It exploits the sleep
metaphor nearly universally applied to describe the termination of a beloved pet that is suffering. The complainants sought regulatory verification
of this popular perception. They therefore requested a Food and Drug Administration investigation and appropriate enforcement action. The agency
refused. The resulting lawsuit was to obtain judicial review of that refusal.
Justice Rehnquist's opinion held that the matter was not reviewable
under the Administrative Procedure Act because the decision not to undertake enforcement in a given case is committed to the agency's discretion.
The Court based this conclusion on a general presumption that enforcement
decisions are discretionary. The only support given for this presumption
was an analogy to prosecutorial discretion in the field of criminal law enforcement. This analogy is not nearly as close as may appear at first blush.
Prosecutorial discretion necessarily applies to decisions by an officer of the
court having general duties and ethical obligations about whether or not to
bring a court action. Enforcement discretion of an administrative agency
ought to be viewed within the context of the legislative standards that define
the agency's purpose. From this vantage, it is clear that an agency's organic
law would employ the "law to apply" to an agency's decision not to pursue
an investigation or enforcement action. The Court's approach was the opposite. The presumption it adopted means that there is "no law to apply"
unless the claimant can point to specific statutory language confining en-

179. IaHat 825.
180. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT,

1977).

DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH

(Alan Sheridan trans.,
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forcement discretion. Otherwise, courts are simply without jurisdiction to
review the agency's failure to act. 181
The Court has been willing to find that there is "no law to apply" in
subsequent cases where the proposition was at least arguable. In Interstate
Commerce Commission v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers,182 the
Court held that an agency refusal to reconsider a ruling on grounds of material error was committed to agency discretion. Justice Scalia distinguished requests for reconsideration on grounds of new evidence or
changed circumstances: "If review of denial to reopen for new evidence or
changed circumstances is unavailable, the petitioner will have been deprived of all opportunity for judicial consideration . . . of facts which,
through no fault of his own, the original proceeding did not contain."' 83
Where a request for reconsideration is based on material error, the claimant
will already have had an opportunity for judicial review of the initial determination. The Court was therefore content to leave it up to the agency to
determine when it should reconsider a ruling, and when it should not.
The Court could have found a legal standard against which to measure
the agency's refusal to reconsider from at least two sources. First, a provision in the applicable statute1 8 4 authorizes the Commission to reopen and
reconsider for material error new evidence or changed circumstances. It is
a dubious approach to statutory construction to say that there is no law to
apply as to one of the statutory factors, but not the other two. Moreover, it
is apparent that in authorizing the Commission to reconsider its rulings,
Congress established, as a matter of principle, that it is more important that
the Commission's decisions be correct than that they be final. Whether the
agency abused its discretion in refusing to consider a new line of argument
as the basis for reopening a decision could have been judged by this
standard.
Second, had the agency reconsidered and then affirmed its prior ruling,
the parties to the proceeding would have a clear right of judicial review. In
this particular case, the Commission explained its decision not to reconsider
in a lengthy opinion. This explanation provided an adequate basis upon
which a reviewing court could rest its judgment as to whether or not the
agency had abused its discretion. Thus, the agencies refusal to reconsider
could have treated as reconsideration resulting in no change in the earlier
181. This conclusion was reached notwithstanding the Administrative Procedure Act's command: "The reviewing court shall-(l) compel agency action unlawfully withheld .... 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(1) (1988). See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
182. 482 U.S. 270 (1987).

183. Id. at 279.
184. 49 U.S.C. § 10327(g) (1988).
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decision. That would have been the better result, since it is for the agency
to decide whether to characterize its action as a refusal to reconsider, or on
the one hand, reconsideration resulting in no modification on the other.
Obviously, the agency will always choose the former characterization if it
wishes to avoid judicial review. There is no basis in logic, policy, or the
applicable statute to justify this result.
One final example illustrates the artificiality of a Supreme Court determination that there is no law to apply in a given case. In Webster v. Doe,1 5
a homosexual, who the Central Intelligence Agency discharged from employment because he was considered a security threat, claimed that this
determination was arbitrary and capricious. Chief Justice Rehnquist's
opinion for the Court found that the determination of security risks was
committed to agency discretion. The opinion states that the National Security Act "allows termination of an Agency employee whenever the Director 'shall deem such termination necessary or advisable in the interests of
the United States,' not simply when the dismissal is necessary or advisable
to those interests."1 6 The Court's emphasis on the use of the term "deem"
hardly seems adequate to justify the conclusion that there is no law to apply
here. After all, Congress could have authorized the Director of Central
Intelligence to terminate employees in his discretion, but it did not do so.
The authority to terminate employees when the Director "deems" it necessary, as opposed to when it "is" necessary, may signify the applicability of a
different standard of review,18 7 but it seems less than obvious that Congress
intended for the Director to have absolute unfettered discretion in such
matters. Perhaps the decision should be understood more as a reflection of
the Court's own reticence in matters of national security, rather than the
result of congressionally mandated forbearance as it purports to be.
The Supreme Court's jurisprudence of judicial review of agency action
has moved decisively in the direction of state absolutism. The doctrines
restricting access to judicial review operate like trump cards canceling out
claims of abuse of discretion by administrative agencies. The upshot of this
development is that individuals seeking fairness and accountability from
their government will have to find more effective ways to deal with adminis185. 486 U.S. 592 (1988).
186. Id. at 600 (quoting National Security Act of 1947 § 102(c), 50 U.S.C. § 4036 (1985))
(emphasis in original).
187. Arguably, what the Director "deems" should only be set aside if it is arbitrary and
capricious. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1988). If the Director is authorized to act only when it is
necessary, a reviewing court may set aside a decision that is not reasonably within his statutory
authority. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (1988). This latter standard may be somewhat less deferential than the "arbitrary and capricious" standard. See supranotes 94-108 and accompanying text.
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trative agencies. In the contemporary environment, it is not an overstatement to assert that if a party does not prevail in the agency the likelihood of
eventual success is virtually nil.
V.

ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE

The course of Supreme Court decisions surveyed in the foregoing sections has in large measure remitted the American public to a system of
administrative justice. There is nothing inherent in such a system that renders it either superior or inferior to the system of legal justice administered
by courts. It is important, however, to recognize the intrinsic differences
between administrative and legal justice.
The cornerstone of legal justice in the United States is due process. Outcomes are considered just to the extent that they were attained by way of
fair procedures. In a very real sense, having one's day in court is the essence of legal justice. The trial of a legal dispute is an event which has as its
principal virtues orderly rules of procedure that are supposed to assure fairness and an element of finality that is supposed to dispose of the matters
presented free of doubts about the ultimate correctness of the decision.
Administrative justice, by contrast, is arrived at by way of a more openended and fluid process. Though the fairness of administrative process is
often an important consideration, the principal justification for administrative action is its rationality. The distinction being drawn here is a matter of
emphasis rather than exclusivity. The intrinsic nature of legal justice is that
it is premised on fairness; rationality, albeit important, is a secondary consideration. Administrative justice transposes the emphasis; rationality is
the primary concern, fairness is secondary.
The distinction between legal and administrative justice is played out in
important, practical ways. As previously stated, legal justice derives primarily from an event-a trial. Even in the vast majority of disputes which
are resolved without a trial, the specter of that event is the defining concept
in the relationship among the parties. Intrinsic elements of a legal dispute
are the formal constraints of procedural rules, the indispensability of professional legal counsel, and the insularity of the decisionmakers.
Administrative justice need not be reduced to the singularity of a trial.
Most administrative agencies permit non-lawyer representatives to participate in proceedings. Indeed, technical expertise that relates to the agency's
function is more highly valued than legal professionalism. Rules of procedure are facilitative rather than exclusive. Questions about the adequacy of
procedures go to substance rather than form. For example, if a party receives actual notice, defective service is not fatal. Most important, perhaps,
is the flexible nature of public access to administrative agencies. Ex parte
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contacts between members of the public and responsible agency officials is
an accepted characteristic of the administrative process. The limitations on
such informal exchanges afford agencies considerable flexibility. i 8 Additionally, legislation like the Freedom of Information Act"8 9 and the Government in the Sunshine Act1 90 afford public access to administrative
records and meetings. These statutes may be the most important tools in
the system of administrative justice for persons who are not well connected
with the individuals in the revolving door that separates government, industry, and academia.
A responsible and honest system of administrative justice is as capable
of serving the interests of a free people as a federal "judiciary of high competence and character."1 9 By the same token, an unaccountable system of
administrative justice is as dangerous as an unprincipled judiciary. Safeguards are needed to ensure the faithful prosecution of the people's business
by agencies and courts alike.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The institutional safeguards of the American system of administrative
justice have been seriously weakened by the decisions of the Supreme Court
in recent years. Consequently, our reliance on this system is increasingly
problematic. The American people have been led to believe that they have
been oppressed by a government that is too large and too expensive. The
point is debatable. What is clear, however, is that accountability and restraint of administrative agencies has been diminished. Judicial review is
played out like a cynical shell game, in which the government always wins
and the institutional checks and balances of administrative power are
proven to be ineffectual. The irony in this development is that presidents
who promised to get the government off people's backs, appointed a Court
which has "unchecked" the power of the administrative state.

188. See Professional Air Traffic Controllers Org. v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 685 F.2d
547 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
189. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988).

190. 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1988).
191.

Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 489 (1951).

